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THE FAITHLESS SERVANT DOCTRINE: AN EMPLOYER’S 
REMEDY FOR WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Elizabeth McKelvy* 
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2018, the Metropolitan Opera (the Met) sued their longtime
music director, James Levine, for the entire salary paid to him during 
his forty-one years of employment.1  The Met claimed that the famed 
conductor “engaged in sexually abusive and harassing conduct both 
before and during the period when he worked at the Met” and sought 
recoupment of the $5.8 million salary as a remedy for his breach of 
loyalty to the company.2  In its suit, the Met invoked the faithless 
servant doctrine, which allows employers to recover damages 
measured by the compensation paid to disloyal employees during 
periods of misconduct.3 
The Levine story came in the wake of a recent spike in public 
attention for workplace sexual harassment across the country.4 
Reports of prominent figures like Harvey Weinstein, Kevin Spacey, 
and Matt Lauer allegedly engaging in sexual harassment in (and out 
of) the workplace have littered news headlines almost daily.5  In 2018 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2020; B.A., Government and
Politics, Broadcast Journalism, University of Maryland, College Park, 2015.  I give
my sincerest appreciation to Professor John Bessler for his patience and insightful
guidance.  I also thank my dear friend Erin D. Brooks for her assistance in developing
the topic of this Comment, as well as the staff of the University of Baltimore Law
Review for their tireless efforts.  I further thank all my friends and family for their
unwavering encouragement and support.  I dedicate this Comment to my parents,
whose hard work inspires me everyday and whose love goes unmatched.
1. Ellie Kaufman, Met Opera Sues Former Conductor for $5.8 Million Over Sexual
Misconduct Allegations, CNN (May 19, 2018, 1:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
05/18/us/met-opera-sues-conductor/index.html [https://perma.cc/SR3H-KR4K].
2. Id.; see also Statement from the Metropolitan Opera Regarding James Levine,
METROPOLITAN OPERA (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.metopera.org/about/press-
releases/statement-from-the-metropolitan-opera-regarding-james-levine/
[https://perma.cc/MRF4-AY4L].
3. Kaufman, supra note 1; see also Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Application of
“Faithless Servant Doctrine”, 24 A.L.R.6th 399, 410 (2007).
4. 2018 EEOC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 8 [hereinafter EEOC REP.].
5. Sandra Gonzalez et al., The Year Since the Weinstein Scandal First Rocked
Hollywood, CNN (Oct. 4, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/05/entertain
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alone, the amount of workplace sexual harassment lawsuits rose by a 
staggering fifty percent and reports of workplace sexual harassment 
rose by a considerable thirteen percent.6 
Many of these stories end like Levine’s—with termination.7  While 
ousting a sexual harasser from a company stops the misconduct from 
occurring, an employer in this situation is typically left with an 
unsolved and ongoing financial mess.8  Companies that experience 
sexual harassment within their walls undergo extreme monetary 
losses.9  The effect of workplace sexual harassment on other 
employees is also a great expense, as lowered morale, employee 
turnover, and litigation costs are all at play.10  Publicly, reputation 
effects following these types of claims render extraordinary financial 
losses as well, causing companies to drop in value at alarming rates.11  
Even still, while these effects of workplace sexual harassment are 
systematic and widespread, damages can often be difficult for 
employers to definitively and directly prove.12 
The faithless servant doctrine is a solution for similarly situated 
employers who need an adequate remedy to cure the severe harm 
levied by disloyal sexual harassers.13  The doctrine not only punishes 
faithless employees but also deters future sexual harassment within 
the workplace.14  The doctrine is unique in that it does not require a 
showing of damages linked to the disloyal act;15 this is key to its 
application in the arena of sexual harassment where damages can be 
ment/weinstein-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/7AQQ-C5D9]; see also 
#MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2019, 3:20 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-
htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/KL3C-YKF9]. 
6. EEOC REP., supra note 4, at 32, 35.
7. Kaufman, supra note 1; #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, supra note 5.
8. Sexual-Harassment Scandals Are Hurting Companies’ Reputations and Balance








12. Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant? Reconciling Employment Law,
Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777, 778–81.
13. Kaufman, supra note 1.
14. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay on Restoration of
Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1135, 1139 (2010).
15. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 779–80.
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difficult to prove.16  This leaves the faithless servant doctrine as a 
unique mechanism for some employers to combat sexual 
harassment.17  While case law applying the faithless servant doctrine 
to sexual harassment is undeveloped at this time,18 the courts must 
strictly adhere to the doctrine in these cases in order to protect 
employers by preserving the option of the remedy.19 
States have taken various approaches to the faithless servant 
doctrine.20  Some have stripped the option from desperate employers 
looking for an avenue to fix the harm exacted by former employees, 
and, in doing so, effectively punish employers when it is their 
employees who have acted unfaithfully and should be punished.21  
Other states have embraced the doctrine and, heralding its interests in 
fairness and equity, have applied it strictly.22  Others have employed 
different standards and set varying limitations, which can create 
uncertainty and confusion in the courts.23  
Because the issue of sexual harassment as related to the faithless 
servant doctrine is in its infancy, coupled with the fact that lawsuits 
of this type have sharply increased in the past year,24 courts will 
likely be faced with questions about how the doctrine should be 
applied in such cases.25  A clear approach applying the doctrine 
strictly in cases of sexual harassment is imminently imperative in 
order to deter the behavior and provide businesses with 
predictability.26  This can be accomplished through a model statute 
that states can codify, which will provide the necessary clarity and 
16. Id. at 778–81.
17. Id.
18. See Pozner v. Fox Broad. Co., 74 N.Y.S.3d 711, 714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (noting the
infrequency of cases in New York addressing the application of the faithless servant
doctrine regarding sexual harassment).
19. See id. (denying remedy to Fox Broadcasting Company for a faithless servant claim
that was based solely on sexual harassment allegations).




24. EEOC REP., supra note 4, at 8, 32.
25. See id. at 32 (discussing the drastic increase of workplace sexual harassment
allegations over the past few years); see also Pozner v. Fox Broad. Co., 74 N.Y.S.3d
711, 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (providing an example of the courts already having to
address how to apply the faithless servant doctrine in the context of a sexual
harassment case).
26. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
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afford maximum preservation of an equitable remedy for employers 
who suffer from the actions of disloyal employees.27  
This Comment looks to explore the viability of such a model 
statute in the context of workplace sexual harassment.  Part II of this 
Comment provides a background of the faithless servant doctrine’s 
roots in agency and contract law.28  Part III explores different 
jurisdictional approaches to the doctrine, including the limitations set 
forth thereto, and will demonstrate the benefits of strict 
construction.29  Part IV outlines why the doctrine is necessary by 
examining the harmful effects of sexual harassment allegations on 
business entities,30 while Part V explores how the doctrine has been 
applied and utilized in these types of cases specifically.31  Finally, 
Part VI looks at the benefits, which far outweigh the costs, of the 
faithless servant doctrine and provides a recommendation for a 
much-needed model statute designed for application to sexual 
harassment cases.32 
II. BACKGROUND
The faithless servant doctrine draws on various areas of law, most
prominently, agency and contract law.33  Although the doctrine has 
been described as “excessively harsh” by some,34 these roots 
demonstrate that the strictness of the doctrine grows out of a strong 
basis in fundamental areas of law that are widely accepted.35  Today, 
the faithless servant doctrine can be invoked to clawback 
compensation from a disloyal employee in conjunction with a breach 
of fiduciary duty claim, a breach of contract claim, or both.36    
A. Agency Law
The principles of agency are central to the doctrine’s justification
of the compensation clawback remedy, which at first blush may 
27. See infra Part VI.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part V.
32. See infra Part VI.
33. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 781.
34. See Pearl Zuchlewski & Geoffrey A. Mort, “Faithless Servant” Doctrine Still
Followed by Some States, but Rejected as Overtly Punitive by Others, A.B.A. 1, 6
(2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meet
ings/2011/ac2011/027.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W49-R8QK].
35. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 781–83.
36. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2003).
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sound unfounded.37  For example, in their case against Levine, the 
Met sought $5.8 million in salary that had already been paid out over 
a forty-one year period.38  Once it is understood that in return for that 
salary, Levine agreed to a legal obligation to conduct himself with a 
high standard throughout his employment with the Met, the fairness 
of the faithless servant doctrine becomes undeniable.39  
After laying out the allegations of Levine’s misconduct, the Met 
claimed that Levine “unquestionably violated his duty of loyalty” 
through “repeated acts of sexual misconduct during his association 
with the Met, including during the period that [he] was responsible 
for the Young Artist Program.”40  The duty of loyalty obligates an 
employer’s agent “to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the 
performance of his duties.”41  Levine’s duty of loyalty flowed from 
his fiduciary relationship with the Met, which “creates the highest 
duty of loyalty known to the law,” and can be created through the 
terms of a contract or as a matter of law based on the relationship 
between the parties.42  The faithless servant doctrine’s roots in 
agency law explain the doctrine’s high regard for the duty of loyalty 
and the extreme disdain for a breach thereof.43 
The high standard that agency law sets for the duty of loyalty also 
provides the remedy known as “equitable clawback” upon breach.44  
It is “restitutionary” in nature and “is generally referred to as 
restoration of compensation or forfeiture of compensation.”45  The 
faithless servant doctrine thus “establishes a mandate that an agent 
who engages in activities that breach his fiduciary duties to his 
principal is not entitled to and must forfeit any compensation for 
services rendered during the period of his breach.”46  This means that 
if the Met established that Levine had breached his duty of loyalty, 
he would have been required to pay back the Met $5.8 million under 
37. Warren, supra note 14, at 1136.
38. Kaufman, supra note 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Bruce Haring, Metropolitan Opera Counter-Sues Former Conductor
James Levine, Raises New Allegations, DEADLINE (May 18, 2018, 7:28 PM),
https://deadline.com/2018/05/metropolitan-opera-counter-sues-former-conductor-
james-levine-raises-new-allegations-1202394453/ [https://perma.cc/6NHK-ZSKC].
41. W. Elec. Co. v. Brenner, 360 N.E.2d 1091, 1094 (N.Y. 1977).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft 2018).
43. See Warren, supra note 14, at 1136.
44. Id. (emphasis omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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the theory that by engaging in sexually harassing behavior at his 
workplace, he at that point forfeited his salary and was never owed it 
at the outset.47  
1. Agency Law and Equitable Clawback
The beauty of the faithless servant doctrine as applied to cases of
sexual harassment is that it not only compensates the injured 
employer but is also a tool for deterring future acts, a concept rooted 
in agency law as well.48  “Like all other fiduciary remedies, the 
equitable clawback remedy was developed to serve a prophylactic 
function, deterring fiducial misbehavior through the imposition of a 
risk of forfeiture that could far exceed the proceeds, if any, derived 
from the fiduciary’s misconduct.”49  The risk of a disgorgement of 
profits is an invaluable tool that agency law gifts to the faithless 
servant doctrine.50  This risk would not only deter the breaching 
party, Levine, in our example, but possibly other parties as well.51  A 
$5.8 million bill may have deterred not only Levine from sexually 
harassing in the future, but also other Met employees, as they now 
know of their employer’s strict position on the matter.52  On a larger 
scale, the deterrent effects would only grow if states codified this 
rule, as it would clearly indicate the consequences of workplace 
sexual harassment at any place of employment.53  
2. Agency Law and Punitive Damages
Although an award of punitive damages may be available in certain
cases under an agency theory, this remedy is not a sufficient 
alternative to the faithless servant doctrine.54  While “[t]he purpose of 
punitive damages ‘is not so much to compensate the [injured] but to 
punish the wrongdoer and to warn others,’” it does not follow that 
employers will be adequately protected by the existence of punitive 
damages.55  Virginia, for example, limits the availability of punitive 
damages only to cases involving “misconduct or actual malice, or 
such recklessness or negligence as to evince a conscious disregard of 
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1137.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Kaufman, supra note 1.
52. See Warren, supra note 14, at 1137.
53. See infra Part III.
54. S. Pierre Assocs. v. Meyers, 820 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488–89 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006).
55. Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 699 (Va. 2007).
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the rights of others.”56  Further, although the faithless servant 
doctrine does have “a punitive purpose, it also furthers other ends and 
its roots are in equity, not law.”57   
Additionally, some courts believe “that the disgorgement of 
compensation received by a faithless servant, under the faithless 
servant doctrine, is proper and not tantamount to the imposition of 
punitive damages or unconscionable.”58  The availability of punitive 
damages does not eliminate the need for compensatory damages 
under the faithless servant doctrine, as a contract claim may be the 
employer’s only option (where punitive damages are usually 
unavailable), or the disloyal employee’s actions may not rise to the 
requisite level for an award of punitive damages.59  
B. Contract Law
As discussed, a faithless servant doctrine claim could also be
invoked following a breach of contract.60  Any disloyal 
transgressions clearly “arise[] out of and relate[] to the contract 
which is the genesis of the relationship and the consequent duty.”61  
In other words, using Levine as an example, the Met’s employment 
contract with him established a relationship that imposed upon 
Levine certain duties that he contracted to uphold, and if he did not 
do so, then he would be in breach of his contract.62  Much like 
56. Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, 445 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Va. 1994).
57. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 812 n.203.
58. Van Arsdale, supra note 3, at 411.
59. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 812 n.203.  Sullivan asserts that the ruling by the Supreme
Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore about the constitutionality of punitive
damages may also affect the faithless servant doctrine, which “must give way to
statutory enactments.”  Id.  BMW held that “due process limits uncapped punitive
damages awards,” and gave three constitutional guideposts: “(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio between punitive and actual
and potential damages; and (3) a comparison of the punitive damages figure and other
civil and criminal penalties imposed for comparable conduct.”  Id.  Sullivan argues
that these cases deal with straightforward awards of punitive damages by juries, and
that the faithless servant doctrine has differing purposes and is based on a concept of
equity, not law.  Id.
60. See Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2003).  In
Phansalkar, the employer brought action against an employee for breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion.  Id. at 187–88.  The court applied the
faithless servant doctrine and ordered the forfeiture of the disloyal employee’s salary
and his interest in certain investments.  Id. at 211.
61. CARCO Grp., Inc. v. Maconachy, 718 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bravo
Knits, Inc. v. DeYoung, 35 A.D.2d. 932, 932–33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)).
62. See Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 200.
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agency law’s high standard for the duties of an employee,63 contract 
law has a strong interest in preserving contractual employment 
relationships and remedying a breach, which further bolsters the 
faithless servant doctrine’s compensatory purpose.64 
The faithless servant doctrine also expands upon certain principles 
of contract law, which traditionally would not allow an employer to 
“directly recover the gain realized by the employee from [his] 
breach.”65  The doctrine applies, in contrast, “regardless of whether 
‘the services were beneficial to the principal, or that the principal 
suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach of fidelity by 
the agent.’”66  Levine, therefore, under the faithless servant doctrine, 
would be denied the opportunity to recover under a quantum meruit 
defense for the value of any services he provided, even those done 
faithfully or properly.67  In other words, even if Levine was able to 
prove that the Met made a profit from his services, the Met would 
still be able to clawback his compensation without the offset of the 
value he provided to the company.68   
1. Contract Law and Damages
Further, under the faithless servant doctrine, the Met did not need
to prove that it suffered any damages whatsoever arising out of 
Levine’s sexual harassment and breach of his employment duties.69  
“[F]orfeiture of compensation can be awarded based on the 
employee’s disloyalty itself.”70  This distinctive relaxation of 
traditional contract rules in the application of the faithless servant 
doctrine is grounded in the deterrent purpose of the doctrine: “[I]t 
makes no difference whether the result of the agent’s conduct is 
injurious to the principal or not, as the misconduct of the agent 
affects the contract from considerations of public policy rather than 
63. See Warren, supra note 14, at 1135–36.
64. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 781–82.
65. Id. at 792.
66. COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 94:53, at 1160 (Robert L.
Haig ed., 4th ed. 2015) (quoting Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, Ltd., 363 N.E.2d 350, 351
(N.Y. 1977)).
67. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 779.  Further, it is the disloyalty, not its consequences to
the employer or principal, which is condemned.  See id. at 791.  The disloyalty itself
bars the agent from compensation, and the failure of the principal to prove direct
damage to its business may not bar recovery of such compensation.  See id. at 791,
798 & n.115.
68. See id. at 794.
69. See Van Arsdale, supra note 3, at 415.
70. Id.
2019] The Faithless Servant Doctrine 125 
of injury to the principal.”71  The public policy concerns in deterring 
sexual harassment in the workplace are paramount in the modern 
climate; a model code which clearly lays out these rules and 
principles would be extremely beneficial to courts in applying the 
faithless servant doctrine.72 
Additionally, as a practical matter, damages in many faithless 
servant cases are difficult to quantify, as the disloyal acts are often 
sporadic and can occur over long periods of time, just as in the 
Levine case.73  Alone, contract law limited the Met to “expectation 
damages,”74 and agency/tort law employs various limitations on the 
imposition of damages.75  Without the faithless servant doctrine, if 
the Met was unable to prove that it suffered harm as a direct result of 
Levine’s disloyalty, it would not have been able to recover under 
these traditional avenues of law.76  Regardless, the negative effects of 
workplace sexual harassment have been strongly proven and exist 
across the spectrum.77  Without the exception the faithless servant 
doctrine allows, employers who suffer these damages but are unable 
to prove them as a direct result of the sexual harassment would have 
no protection under the law in the way of compensatory remedies, 
which means no deterrent effects on other employees.78  The faithless 
servant doctrine protects employers by preserving a remedy that 
would be otherwise unavailable due to merely practical 
deficiencies.79 
III. JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES TO THE FAITHLESS
SERVANT DOCTRINE
There are many variations in the application of the faithless servant 
doctrine from one state to another.80  States that embrace the doctrine 
recognize the importance of the public policy concerns behind it and 
are responsible in their construction to protect the equitable remedy 
71. Steinmetz v. Kern, 32 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ill. 1941) (citing Sidway v. Am. Mortg. Co.,
78 N.E. 561 (Ill. 1906)).
72. See EEOC REP., supra note 4, at 31–34.
73. Kaufman, supra note 1; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 780–81.
74. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 781.
75. See id. at 781–82.
76. See id. at 779–81.
77. See infra Part IV.
78. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 779–81.
79. Id. at 779–80.
80. Id. at 806.
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as an option for employers.81  Other states have rejected the doctrine, 
leaving employers limited.82  While some restrictions on the doctrine 
are necessary, all states should adopt a model statute that will allow 
the faithless servant doctrine’s application in cases of sexual 
harassment.83 
A. Strict Construction of the Doctrine
New York is the birthplace of the faithless servant doctrine and
remains the state where it has been most developed and “robustly” 
applied.84  In 1971, “[t]he term ‘faithless servant’ was coined . . . in 
Herman v. Branch Motor Express Co.,” but was derived from New 
York precedent and principles that dated back to the nineteenth 
century.85   
In New York, conduct that has been classified as that of a faithless 
servant has included “theft or embezzlement, failure to pay to the 
employer compensation received for outside work, misappropriation 
of trade secrets, misappropriation of the employer’s opportunity, 
involvement in a transaction in which the employee had an interest 
adverse to his employer, and competing with the employer while still 
employed.”86  In New York, neither intent to defraud the employer 
nor actual damage to the employer as a result of the disloyal actions 
need to be proven in order to warrant a clawback of compensation.87   
Presumably with employers’ interests in mind, New York courts 
employ two standards in determining whether an employee’s disloyal 
81. See generally id. at 808–09, 812 (citing Herman v. Branch Motor Express Co., 323
N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971)) (discussing the common ways in which courts in
various jurisdictions employ the faithless servant doctrine so as to limit the severity of
its implication while still allowing employers to recover damages).
82. See Van Arsdale, supra note 3, at 421–22 (examining New Mexico law and the
limited availability of remedial measures in jurisdictions where the faithless servant
doctrine is not recognized).
83. See infra Part VI.
84. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 796, 806.
85. Id. at 796–99 (“[An agent] is prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with
his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and
loyalty in the performance of his duties.  Not only must the employee or agent
account to his principal for secret profits, but he also forfeits his right to compensation
for services rendered by him if he proves disloyal.” (quoting Lamdin v. Broadway
Surface Advert. Corp., 5 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 1936))).
86. Id. at 803.
87. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It does
not ‘make any difference that the services were beneficial to the principal, or that the
principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach of fidelity by the
agent.’” (quoting Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, Ltd., 41 N.Y.2d 928, 928–29 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977))).
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actions rise to the necessary level for that employee to be considered 
a “faithless servant” for purposes of the doctrine.88  New York courts 
have declined to explicitly choose one standard over the other, which 
greatly preserves the use of the faithless servant doctrine for 
employers by giving them the ability to satisfy either standard to 
apply the doctrine to their case.89 
The first standard says that forfeiture is available when a disloyal 
employee’s “misconduct and unfaithfulness . . . substantially violates 
the contract of service” and “permeates the employee’s service.”90 
For example, in Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., the court 
found that the disloyalties “substantially violated” the terms of the 
employee’s service when they occurred in “four out [of] five of an 
employee’s primary areas of responsibility and continue[d] over 
many months.”91  Further, the court noted that the disloyalty had only 
been found not to meet the “substantial” level “where the disloyalty 
consisted of a single act, or where the employer knew of and 
tolerated the behavior.”92  This suggests that the “substantial” 
requirement is a lower standard that can be met more easily than the 
alternate standard the court later delineates.93  
The second standard outlines that misconduct which “rises to the 
level of a breach of a duty of loyalty or good faith is sufficient to 
warrant forfeiture.”94  The Phansalkar court also found that this 
standard was met when the employee “acted in a manner inconsistent 
with his agency by withholding . . . cash, stocks, and other interests 
that belonged to” his employer.95  
There are, however, some limitations that even the New York 
courts have imposed on the application of the doctrine, but these 
88. Id. at 201 (applying New York law).
89. See id. at 202.
90. Id. at 201 (quoting Turner v. Kouwenhoven, 2 N.E. 637, 639 (N.Y. 1885)).
91. Id. at 202.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 201–02 (discussing the fact that there are only limited circumstances where
the “substantial” level is not found, which makes the “substantial” level easier to
obtain than other standards).
94. Id. at 202 (“An agent is held to the uberrima fides in his dealings with his principal,
and if he acts adversely to his employer in any part of the transaction, or omits to
disclose any interest which would naturally influence his conduct in dealing with the
subject of the employment, it amounts to such a fraud upon the principal, as to forfeit
any right to compensation for his services.” (quoting Murray v. Beard, 7 N.E. 553,
554 (N.Y. 1886))).
95. Id. at 203.
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limitations only apply in the narrowest of circumstances.96  The 
Herman court held that “the bar to a faithless servant’s recovery 
applies only to the period of his faithlessness.”97  The Phansalkar 
court later clarified that this period of faithlessness begins on the date 
the disloyalty started and extends to the last date of employment.98  
For example, the employee in Maritime Fish Products, Inc. v. World-
Wide Fish Products, Inc., who was employed for about seven years, 
was only ordered to forfeit his compensation from fourteen months, 
starting on the date he began acting disloyally and ending on the date 
of his resignation.99   
The doctrine has also been relaxed when it comes to certain 
circumstances involving task-based employment; in Design Strategy, 
Inc. v. Davis the employee at issue was only disloyal in some of the 
tasks performed, and the court ordered forfeiture of compensation for 
only those tasks performed disloyally.100  This modification, 
however, is very strict and only applies in specific circumstances, 
[W]here: (1) the parties had agreed that the agent will be
paid on a task-by-task basis (e.g., a commission on each sale
arranged by the agent), (2) the agent engaged in no
misconduct at all with respect to certain tasks, and (3) the
agent’s disloyalty with respect to other tasks “neither tainted
nor interfered with the completion of” the tasks as to which
the agent was loyal.101
Further, when an employment agreement outlines “general 
compensation,” rather than “limit[ing] compensation to specific 
amounts paid for the completion of specific tasks,” it is inappropriate 
to limit the forfeiture.102  Levine’s compensation, for example, would 
not be limited in the Met’s case against him, as he was paid on a 
salaried basis, rather than for each performance or teaching 
session.103 
96. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 804.
97. Herman v. Branch Motor Express Co., 323 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
98. Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 208.
99. Mar. Fish Prods., Inc. v. World-Wide Fish Prods., Inc., 100 A.D.2d 81, 90–91 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).  Compensation available for forfeiture is also a very broad category
in New York, including “salary or wages, bonuses, pension benefits, post-retirement
insurance, and vacation pay.”  Sullivan, supra note 12, at 803.
100. Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 300–02 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying N.Y.
law).
101. Id. at 301 (quoting Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 205).
102. Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 208.
103. See Kaufman, supra note 1.
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New York maintains a very strict construction of the faithless 
servant doctrine, an approach which is desirable in cases of sexual 
harassment, and its limitations would probably not apply in most 
situations.104  The Met, for example, would most likely have been 
subject only to the restriction delineated in Maritime Fish, limiting 
forfeiture of Levine’s compensation to a start date of the day the 
disloyalty began.105  New York is strongly against limiting forfeiture 
of compensation, finding it appropriate only in extreme 
circumstances.106  The state’s approach maintains their interest in 
public policy as: “The primary purpose of . . . the ‘faithless servant 
doctrine,’ is to deter disloyal conduct, so ‘that all temptation shall be 
removed from one acting in a fiduciary capacity to abuse his 
trust.’”107  New York’s strict approach would serve the faithless 
servant doctrine’s two main goals as applied to workplace sexual 
harassment: protection of employers and deterrence of bad 
behavior.108  
B. Other Approaches to the Doctrine
Many other states have followed in New York’s footsteps of
strictly applying the faithless servant doctrine, including South 
Carolina, Michigan, Kansas, Massachusetts, Florida, Oregon, and 
Alabama.109  Others, however, have taken a more relaxed approach, 
and some have rejected it completely.110   
Colorado and Wisconsin employ a balancing test that considers 
“the nature of the employment relationship, the specific kind of 
disloyal action engaged in and the benefits received by the employer 
from the individual during the period of disloyalty.”111  Colorado, in 
particular, looks at the severity of the disloyal conduct to determine 
104. See generally Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 206 (stating that limitations of the faithless
servant doctrine are limited and only apply in specific situations).
105. See Mar. Fish Prods., Inc. v. World-Wide Fish Prods., Inc., 100 A.D.2d 81, 91 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
106. Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 202.  The court expressed a “concern that we should not relax
New York’s rule of forfeiture any further.”  Id. at 206.
107. Tyco Int’l, Ltd. v. Kozlowski, 756 F. Supp. 2d 553, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing
Robert Reis & Co. v. Volck, 151 A.D. 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912)).
108. See infra Part IV.
109. Zuchlewski & Mort, supra note 34, at 3–5.
110. Id. at 5–7.
111. Id. at 5.
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the amount of compensation forfeiture,112 while Wisconsin examines 
“the difference between the harm suffered by the employer and the 
benefits the employer received during the period of disloyalty.”113  
Although some favor the balancing test approaches for their 
“flexibility” and consideration of a disloyal employee’s 
“achievements or contributions to the company,” 114 the New York 
bright-line rule should be applied in cases of sexual harassment.  The 
relaxed approaches do not provide the necessary punitive effects to 
deter future similar behavior.115  Additionally, these relaxed 
approaches may adequately operate in other contexts, but strict 
construction is needed in cases of sexual harassment where the 
benefits to the employer may be great, but the damages suffered are 
difficult to quantify.116  
Other states have left employers with nothing by rejecting the 
faithless servant doctrine completely, “in part because they view it as 
excessively harsh, unbalanced and punitive.”117  In New Mexico, the 
Court of Appeals declined the opportunity to adopt the doctrine, 
concluding that application of the doctrine would “go beyond the 
intention of the parties” and under the circumstances, would “be . . . 
inequitable and unjustified.”118  New Hampshire likewise has denied 
the chance to adopt the doctrine.119  Yet, the rigidity of the doctrine 
that these states reject is exactly what makes the doctrine a perfect 
tool for employers when a disloyal employee’s conduct involves 
sexual harassment.120  Although states such as New Hampshire and 
New Mexico may very well reject the faithless servant doctrine in 
circumstances involving other employment issues, the doctrine 
should be adopted nationwide when sexual harassment claims 
arise.121  The risk of compensation forfeiture is a necessary deterrent 
that is neither inequitable nor unjustified in the context of sexual 
harassment.122  
112. Id. (citing Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 494 (Colo. 1989)) (“[T]he
court ruled that there should be a total bar on the compensation where an employee’s
conduct is as serious as soliciting the employer’s customers.”).
113. Id. at 5–6 (citing Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 289 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Wis. 1980)).
114. Id. at 6.
115. See supra notes 85–114 and accompanying text.
116. See infra Part IV.
117. Zuchlewski & Mort, supra note 34, at 6.
118. Id. (quoting Woods v. Collins, 533 P.2d 759, 761 (N.M. 1975)).
119. Id. at 6–7 (citing Gen. Insulation Co. v. Eckman Constr., 992 A.2d 613, 621 (N.H.
2010)).
120. See infra Part IV.
121. See infra Part IV.
122. See infra Part IV.
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IV. THE NEED FOR THE DOCTRINE: EFFECTS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON A BUSINESS
The effects following a sexual harassment allegation on an 
organization are harder to quantify than other forms of a breach of 
loyalty, such as a self-dealing fiduciary realizing a material benefit 
belonging to his employer.123  As effects related to sexual harassment 
are proven to be present in both the public arena and internally within 
organizations plagued by sexual harassment, a solution for employers 
is necessary in order to compensate their losses.124  Because damages 
from these effects can often be difficult to prove, the faithless servant 
doctrine is of vital importance in the context of sexual harassment to 
ensure employers have a solution to recoup losses exacted by 
unfaithful employees.125  
A. Effects on Employer Image Following Sexual Harassment
Allegations
A company’s public image is at risk following a sexual harassment 
allegation.126  Even just one claim can lead the public to believe the 
organization is “structural[ly] unfair” in its entirety regarding gender 
equality.127  Further, research has shown that these claims hurt an 
organization’s public image of financial equity:  
[W]hen people learn that a sexual harassment claim has
been made in an organization, they not only see that
organization as less equitable than an organization where no
such claim was filed, but also less equitable than an
organization where a claim of a different transgression, such
as financial misconduct, was made.128
These negative reputation effects can, in turn, hurt the financial 
standing of a company, as “headline costs of a scandal are clear: 
123. Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2007).
124. See Sexual-Harassment Scandals Are Hurting Companies’ Reputations and Balance
Sheets, supra note 8; see also Serena Does et al., Research: How Sexual Harassment
Affects a Company’s Public Image, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 11, 2018), https://hbr.org/
2018/06/research-how-sexual-harassment-affects-a-companys-public-image
[https://perma.cc/KD5S-BWUM].
125. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 780–81.
126. See Does et al., supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. Id. (“[W]e also find that people see a sexual harassment claim as more indicative of a
culture problem than a bad apple problem – even compared to a claim of fraud.”).
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shares of several big firms have fallen sharply after executive 
departures” involving sexual harassment claims.129   
B. Internal Effects of Workplace Sexual Harassment
Workplace sexual harassment also creates costs to employers
within the walls of their companies.130  Even surpassing litigation 
costs, the largest economic detriment to companies following sexual 
harassment relates to employee turnover, as “targets of harassment 
[are] 6.5 times as likely as non-targets to change jobs.”131  Estimates 
show that it then costs an average of sixteen to twenty percent of an 
employee’s annual salary to replace an employee.132  Additionally, 
sexual harassment in the workplace has been proven to reduce 
motivation as well as both individual and team performance.133  
Reports estimate that the cost in lost productivity of a member of a 
team affected by sexual harassment averages $22,500 per person.134 
The costs to an organization following actual or alleged sexual 
harassment are so widespread and hard to definitively prove on a 
case-by-case basis; therefore, allowing an employer the ability to 
invoke the faithless servant doctrine to clawback compensation is of 
paramount importance.135  Not only does the remedy of 
compensation forfeiture give the employer the opportunity to obtain 
actual monetary damages, it is also a powerful tool for deterring 
sexual harassment in the first place.136  The threat of clawback 
“serves to deter corporate officers and other agents from committing 
acts of disloyalty given the risk of forfeiture of all compensation and 
129. See Sexual-Harassment Scandals Are Hurting Companies’ Reputations and Balance
Sheets, supra note 8.
130. Elyse Shaw, Ariane Hegewisch & Cynthia Hess, Sexual Harassment and Assault at






134. Id.  “Assuming this was calculated using 2007 dollars, this would now be $27,345 per
person in 2018 dollars.”  Id. (citing Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A
Meta-Anaylsis of the Antecedents and Consequences of Workplace Sexual
Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127, 151 (2007)).
135. See generally id. (discussing possible costs to companies, including reduced
productivity, employee turnover, increased absences, and legal costs).
136. DeMott, supra note 123, at 1060.  Further, the existence of the forfeiture remedy
assures “that some remedy will be available against a disloyal agent even when the
agent has realized no material benefit for which the agent must account.”  Id.
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not just that portion that relates to misconduct” and promotes 
responsibility in the workplace.137   
V. THE FAITHLESS SERVANT DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO
SEXUAL HARASSMENTS IN THE COURTS
Courts have had minimal opportunities to explore the faithless 
servant doctrine as applied to cases involving sexual harassment by 
disloyal employees; however, there have been a few cases that have 
analyzed the issue.138  One such case was Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 
where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, applying New 
York law, awarded Astra, the employer, almost $6 million in salary 
and bonuses already paid to a former CEO, Lars Bildman, for the 
period of disloyalty where he repeatedly engaged in sexual 
harassment.139  Evidence showed that over approximately fifteen 
years, Bildman authorized multiple settlements to be paid to his 
sexual harassment accusers, entered into a “consulting agreement” 
with his secretary who later testified she was forced into having 
sexual relations with him, and engaged in extensive efforts to cover-
up related allegations, including threats to employees and destruction 
of company property.140  Astra’s image was tarnished as a result of 
Bildman’s indiscretions when Business Week published a cover story 
exposing the allegations.141  It attracted both national and 
international attention and was picked up and published by 150 other 
publications worldwide.142   
The court in Astra found that New York law “require[d] forfeiture” 
of all of Bildman’s compensation during the period of his disloyalty 
to Astra upon a finding that Bildman “had committed numerous and 
137. Warren, supra note 14, at 1151–52 (“The corporation’s recovery rights constitute a
significant asset that should not be wasted by ignorance or indifference . . . [b]y
posing a substantive threat to executive wealth, the equitable clawback remedy, if
stringently applied, should secure a higher level of executive responsibility.”).
138. See Van Arsdale, supra note 3, at 399, 411.
139. Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Mass. 2009).
140. Id. at 40–43.
141. See generally id. at 43 (discussing the publicity around Bildman’s indiscretions and
mentioning some of the consequences that followed).
142. Id.  The article was titled, Abuse of Power: The Astonishing Tale of Sexual
Harassment at Astra USA, and “reported that it had interviewed ‘more than 70 former
and current employees’ and found ‘a disturbing pattern of complaints during much of
Bildman’s 15–year tenure,’ including ‘a dozen cases of women who claimed they
were either fondled or solicited for sexual favors by Bildman or other [Astra]
executives.’”  Id.
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substantial breaches of his fiduciary duties to Astra.”143  The court 
opined that the forfeiture law in New York “has been described as 
harsh . . . however, the harshness of the remedy is precisely the 
point.”144 
A subsequent case, Pozner v. Fox Broadcasting Co., reached a 
different result than that of Astra.145  In finding that Pozner, a former 
executive, did not violate his duty of loyalty after engaging in 
multiple and repeated sexually harassing actions, the court opined 
that the duty of loyalty “has only been extended to cases where the 
employee ‘act[s] directly against the employer’s interests.”146  The 
court failed to outline the application of either of the faithless servant 
standards set forth by New York precedent, stating only that no cases 
had been presented “in which sexual harassment, without more, 
forms the basis for a breach of the duty of loyalty claim.”147  The 
court, however, arguably erred in its failure to apply the applicable 
standards in their faithless servant doctrine analysis.148  
Although the Court found that Pozner did not breach his fiduciary 
duty,149 the standards announced by the same court previously 
required only either a breach of loyalty or good faith, or in the 
alternative standard, disloyalty that substantially violates the 
employment contract and which permeates the service.150  Pozner’s 
actions “substantially violated” his contract of service under the 
Phansalkar definition: the actions were repeated and continued over 
many months.151  These continuous instances of sexual harassment 
violated his employment in his capacity as an executive and leader of 
the Fox Broadcasting Corporation.152  For example, these continuing 
sexual harassing acts most likely led to the resignation of employees 
and the reduction in productivity within the organization.153  The 
143. Id. at 50–51.
144. Id. at 51.
145. Pozner v. Fox Broad. Co., 74 N.Y.S.3d 711, 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
146. Id. at 714 (alteration in original) (quoting Veritas Capital Mgt., L.L.C. v. Campbell,
82 A.D.3d 529, 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)).
147. Id.
148. Compare id. (holding that sexual harassment alone is insufficient to support a finding
of breach of an executive’s fiduciary duties), with Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth
& Co., 344 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that New York law allows for a
breach of loyalty, a breach of good faith, or a disloyalty that violates an employment
clause to be sufficient for a breach of loyalty claim).
149. Pozner, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 714.
150. Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 201–02.
151. Id.
152. See Pozner, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 713.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 131–34.
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allegations presumably also contributed to negative reputation effects 
resulting in a loss of Fox finances.154  The consequences of Pozner’s 
actions, had the Court considered them, could have supported a 
finding of acts of disloyalty, as they are akin to “acts directly against 
the company’s interests.”155  While his actions may not rise to the 
level of breach of fiduciary duty, the Court should have applied the 
faithless servant doctrine to find a breach of good faith or loyalty that 
permeated his service during the time period of the sexual 
harassment, which is a sufficient finding to award forfeiture of his 
compensation under the faithless servant doctrine.156  
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the recent boom in workplace sexual harassment
allegations and lawsuits, courts will presumably continue to 
experience an influx of litigation relating to such misconduct.157  
Sexual harassment in the workplace presents a unique problem for 
employers, as it is difficult to quantify from a damages standpoint, 
but the effects of such incidents are felt throughout multiple levels of 
a company.158  These employers require a remedy that justly 
compensates their losses while deterring future bad behavior.159   
The faithless servant doctrine provides employers with an adequate 
remedy through compensatory forfeiture, but it must be applied 
strictly in cases of sexual harassment to be effective.160  A model 
code should be written and then adopted nationwide that would 
codify New York’s strict construction of the doctrine specifically in 
cases of sexual harassment.161  This model code should give the 
option of both standards for requisite employee misconduct, 
including a substantial violation that permeates service, as well as a 
breach of a duty of loyalty or good faith.162  A breach of fiduciary 
duty is too high a standard as applied to cases of sexual harassment, 
and it fails to consider the purpose of the doctrine in deterring future 
bad behavior.163  The New York rule limiting recovery to the period 
154. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
155. Pozner, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 714–15.
156. See discussion supra Section III.A.
157. EEOC REP., supra note 4, at 8, 32.
158. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 72, 104–08 and accompanying text.
162. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2003).
163. See Pozner v. Fox Broad. Co., 74 N.Y.S.3d 711, 714–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
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of disloyalty is the only limitation that should be included, as those 
involving task-based employment and defining compensation do not 
further the doctrine’s goals in the context of workplace sexual 
harassment.164 
Under the proposed model for the faithless servant doctrine as 
applied to sexual harassment and based upon the alleged facts, 
Levine would most likely have been ordered to forfeit his 
compensation to the Met for the entirety of his 40-year employment, 
provided that the Met could have substantiated its claim that the 
harassment continued throughout the employment relationship.165  
Levine breached his duty of loyalty to the Met by hurting the 
company and abusing his position to engage in sexual harassment 
and misconduct.166  His repeated actions also undoubtedly satisfied 
the definition of substantial violations that permeated his service as 
music director and artistic director of the Young Artists program.167  
The faithless servant doctrine is a strong and necessary tool that must 
be applied in the sexual harassment context to equitably compensate 
employers and deter employees, like Levine, from engaging in future 
bad behavior.168  
164. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
165. Kaufman, supra note 1.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
